A surprising connection on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, most likely a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side writing a small number of political analyses for a firm from China containing confidential or privileged insights. Compensation in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to use recruitment consultants to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, industrial, military and scientific secrets. But a fresh initiative aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage alert was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to Members of Parliament, peers, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from the agency or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its advisory document would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the media helps the general population better identify communications with a fraudulent purpose.
The alert has the effect of flushing out additional details from within parliament, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency wants people in public life to recognize that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, although the recent actions occur after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
The two had been accused of working for China – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a crime if somebody engages in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” security minister a government official informed MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean someone quickly marginal turning significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of direct conflict. The nation has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions internet devices.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to find covert sources on British democracy online because it wants to be provocative, to display power and because it has the capability.